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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to
Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated. This appeal is subject to assignment to the
Utah Court of Appeal under Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated; and has been
assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. (Rec. 1197).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Issue: Was Spencer's underlying action for alienation of affection, brought

"without probable cause" as required to sustain a claim for wrongful use of civil
proceedings?
Standard of Review: A determination of the law is a question of law,
reviewed for correctness. Dipoma v. McPhie, 1 P.3d 564 (Ut.App. 2000); State v. Leyva,
951 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997).
Preservation for Review: The legal standard to establish a claim for
wrongful use of civil proceedings; and whether the dismissal of the prior action, as a
discovery sanction, meant that the action was brought "without probable cause/' was
raised in the trial court. (Rec. 1199, pg. 544-554).
Plain Error Rule and Exceptional Circumstances: If not properly
preserved at trial, this issue should still be addressed on appeal under the plain error rule,
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), or based on the exceptional circumstances.
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State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994).
2.

Issue: Was the termination of Spencer's underlying action for alienation of

affection "on the merits," as required to sustain a claim for wrongful use of civil
proceedings?
Standard of Review: A determination of the law is a question of law,
reviewed for correctness. Dipoma v. McPhie, 1 P.3d 564 (Ut.App. 2000).
Preservation for Review: The legal standard to establish a claim for
wrongful use of civil proceedings; and whether the dismissal of the prior action, based
solely as a discovery sanction, constituted a dismissal "on the merits," was raised in the
trial court. (Reel 199, pg. 544-554).
Plain Error Rule and Exceptional Circumstances: If not properly
preserved at trial, this issue should still be addressed on appeal under the plain error rule,
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), or based on the exceptional circumstances.
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994).
3.

Issue: Was there a "willful act in the use of the process, not proper in the

regular course of the proceeding," in Spencer's underlying action for alienation of
affection, sufficient to sustain a claim for abuse of civil process?
Standard of Review: A determination of the law is a question of law,
reviewed for correctness. Dipoma v. McPhie, 1 P.3d 564 (Ut.App. 2000).
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Preservation for Review: The legal standard to establish a claim for abuse
of civil process, and whether any of the items listed in the jury instructions could alone,
constitute an abuse of process, was raised before the trial court. (Rec. 1199, pg.544-546).
Plain Error Rule and Exceptional Circumstances: If not properly
preserved at trial, this issue should still be addressed on appeal under the plain error rule,
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), or based on the exceptional circumstances.
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994).
4.

Issue: Is Nielsen on his wrongful use of civil proceedings claim, entitled

to prejudgment interest on a damage award of $95,000.00 for the attorneys' fees he
incurred in defending the underlying action brought against him?
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment
interest presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Smith v. Fairfax Realty Inc.,
82 P.3d 1064 (Utah 2003).
Preservation for Review: This issue was raised before the trial court. The
issue was briefed (Rec. 962-1094), and the court issued its Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion
For Prejudgment Interest and Costs, on November 30, 2006. (Rec. 1096-1100).
5.

Issue: Are the attorneys' fees, awarded as damages under Nielsen's

wrongful use of civil proceeding claim, "special damages" under Section 78-27-44
U.C.A., entitling Nielsen to prejudgment interest on his fees, pursuant to 78-27-44
U.C.A.?
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Standard of Review: The interpretation of a statute is reviewed for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation. Summit Water Distrib.
Co. v. Mountain Reg I Water Special Serv. Dist., 108 P.3d 119 (Ut.App. 2005).
Preservation for Review: This issue was raised before the trial court. The
issue was briefed (Rec. 962-1094) and the court issued its ruling interpreting this statute
on November 30, 2006. (Rec. 1096-1100).
6.

Issue: Did Nielsen properly make a claim in his complaint for prejudgment

interest on "special damages actually incurred," as required by the Statute, in order to be
entitled to prejudgment interest under Section 78-27-44 U.C.A.?
Standard of Review: The interpretation of a statute is reviewed for
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's interpretation. Summit Water Distrib.
Co. v. Mountain Reg 7 Water Special Serv. Dist, 108 P.3d 119 (Ut.App. 2005).
Preservation for Review: This issue was raised before the trial court. The
issue was briefed (Rec. 962-1094), and the court issued its ruling interpreting this Statute
on November 30, 2006. (Rec. 1096-1100).
7.

Issue: Is the trial court's interpretation that on Nielsen's tort claim, the

award of $95,000.00 under the Special Verdict form, is all "special damages" with no
general damages, contrary to the law?
Standard of Review: A determination of the law is a question of law,
reviewed for correctness. Dipoma v. McPhie, 1 P.3d 564 (Ut.App. 2000); State v. Leyva,
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951 P.2d 738 (Utah 1997).
Preservation for Review: This issue was raised before the trial court. The
issue was briefed (Rec. 962-1094), and the court issued its ruling interpreting the Special
Verdict form on November 30, 2006. (Rec. 1096-1100).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Proceedings:
In 1996, the Defendant/Appellant, Lorenzo Spencer ("Spencer") brought an
action against the Plaintiff/Appellee, Michael Nielsen ("Nielsen") for alienation of
affection, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Nielsen had been involved in an ongoing sexual relationship with Spencer's
wife, Jewelya Spencer ("Jewelya"), and fathered twins through Jewelya, while she was
married to Spencer. Nielsen met Jewelya again in California in 1995, and Jewelya
subsequently filed for divorce in 1996. (Rec. 741-746) (Civil No. 960700147-PI)
The trial court dismissed Spencer's intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims based upon the statute of limitations. (See Findings on Motion
for Summary Judgment, Rec. 809, f s 5 & 6). The court then ruled that Spencer failed to
produce certain documents in discovery; and therefore dismissed the remaining claim for
alienation of affection, as a discovery sanction, under Rule 37(b)(2)(C). (See Findings on
Motion to Dismiss, Rec 802, % 22).
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After the dismissal of the alienation of affection claim against him, Nielsen
filed this action against Spencer on December 18, 2001, for wrongful use of civil
proceeding and abuse of process. (Rec. 1-7) Nielsen claimed that the alienation of
affection claim was brought against him without probable cause, because Spencer knew
that he could not prevail on his claim against Nielsen. (Rec. 2, ^f 8). Nielsen also filed an
abuse of process claim, alleging that Spencer engage in dilatory tactics in the alienation of
affection case, by failing to produce certain documents, pursuant to discovery requests.
(Rec. 4, f 14). Nielsen claimed that Spencer's intent with the alienation of affection
lawsuit was to harass, and embarrass Nielsen, and cause him to incur substantial time and
expense. (Rec. 4, f 16). Nielsen sought damages for his attorneys' fees incurred in
defending the alienation of affection claim, attorneys' fees for bringing the current action,
as well as, lost earnings and benefits, loss of employment time, emotional distress, mental
pain and suffering, medical expenses, and other expenses to be determined according to
proof. Nielsen also sought punitive damages. (Rec. 3, ^f 10, & 6, ]f 18). Nielsen made no
claim for prejudgment interest; and did not make any claim for "special damages actually
incurred" for medical or hospital care, under Section 78-27-44 U.C.A. (Rec. 3-7).
The matter was set for trial and jury instruction were prepared by Spencer's
counsel on the wrongful use of civil proceedings (Rec. 472), including instructions: that
even good marriages have difficulties and the existence of marital problems does not
justify or excuse a person's intrusion into the marriage relationship (Rec. 476); that the
law recognizes that the enticing away of another man's wife is an act inherently wrong
6

and necessarily known to be wrong (Rec. 474); and that the person's intrusion need not be
the sole cause of the alienation of affection, but that person may be liable if his actions or
conduct was the controlling or the effective cause of the alienation, even though there
were other causes that might have contributed to the alienation. (Rec. 477).
Jury instructions were also prepared by Spencer's attorney regarding the
abuse of civil process (Rec. 473) including instructions that: Nielsen must prove that
Spencer maliciously used the legal process against Nielsen primarily to accomplish a
purpose for which it was not designed (Rec. 473); and that even a pure spite motive is not
sufficient to state a claim for abuse of process where the process is used only to
accomplish the result for which it was created, (Rec. 475).
A 3 day jury trial was held on June 7-9 2006. (Rec. 588-593). At trial
Nielsen testified that he did meet Spencer's wife, Jewelya, on numerous occasions, while
she was married to Spencer, and had sex with her. (Rec. 1199, Trans, pg. 455). He also
admitted that he had an ongoing sexual relationship with Jewelya and suspected that he
was the father when she later became pregnant. (Rec. 1199, Trans, pg. 456). After
Jewelya became pregnant, Nielsen continued to have sexual relations with her. (Rec.
1199, Trans, pgs. 461-463). Blood tests later confirmed that Nielsen was the father of the
twin girls born to Jewelya, while she was married to Spencer. (Reel 199, pg. 428 & 463).
Although Nielsen admitted at trial that he had had sexual relations with
Jewelya and had fathered two children with her while she was married to Spencer,
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Nielsen argued that Spencer and his wife had other marital problems and that Nielsen's
extra-marital affair, the fathering of two children, and the on-going sexual relations with
Spencer's wife; was not the "controlling cause" of the alienation of affection in their
marriage; and therefore, because there were other problems in the marriage, Spencer's
alienation of affection lawsuit against Nielsen, constituted a wrongful use of civil
proceedings. (Rec. 1199, Trans, pg. 570, 579-580).
Nielsen also claimed that Spencer abused the legal process by engaging in
one or more of the following acts, in pursuing his alienation of affection claim against
Nielsen: (a) attempting to take depositions of Nielsen's wife and mother; (b) intentionally
causing crucial evidence to be lost or destroyed; (c) misrepresenting facts in order to
mislead Nielsen, causing him to incur additional expense and time; (d) engaging in delay
tactics, causing Nielsen to incur additional expenses and attorneys' fees; (e) designating
numerous witnesses; and (f) improperly attempting to influence witnesses to misstate
facts. (Jury Instruction No. 19, Rec. 620). Spencer objected to this list of items and
argued that they (particularly standing alone) were not sufficient to constitute an abuse of
the civil process. (Rec. 1199, pg. 544-547). The court ruled that any one of these acts
alone, would be sufficient for abuse of process, and it was a matter for the jury to decide.
(Rec. 1199, pg.544-545). Nielsen argued to the jury, at the close of trial, that any one of
these actions standing alone, was sufficient to constitute an abuse of the civil process.
(Rec. 1199, Trans, pgs. 582-585).
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For damages, Nielsen sought $15,960.00 for lost earnings; $95,000.00 for
the attorneys' fees he incurred in defending the alienation of affection lawsuit, and
$86,000.00 for attorneys fees he incurred in bringing the current action; for a total amount
of $178,960.00. (Rec. 1199, pg. 589). Nielsen also sought punitive damages. (Rec. 1199,
pg. 589-590).
Spencer maintained that the list of items for abuse of process, particularly
standing alone, were not sufficient to constitute an abuse of process. (Rec. 1199, pg. 544547). Spencer further argued that the dismissal of the alienation of affection claim, as a
discovery sanction, did not constitute a dismissal on the merits, nor did it show a lack of
probable cause by Spencer in filing his alienation of affection claim against Nielsen.
(Rec. 1199, pg. 553). After all, Nielsen had admitted that he had sexual relations with
Spencer's wife, fathering twins. (Rec. 1199, pg. 455).
There was no ruling by the court, as a matter of law, that the prior alienation
of affection claim was filed by Spencer without probable cause, or that the alienation of
affection claim was terminated in favor of Nielsen on the merits. There was no ruling by
the court, as a matter of law, that Spencer's failure to comply with discovery requests in
the alienation of affection lawsuit, or that any action taken by Spencer in the alienation of
affection lawsuit, taken alone or collectively, was a "willful act not proper in the regular
course of the proceeding," constituting an abuse of civil process.

9

Spencer objected to the jury instructions prepared regarding the wrongful
use of civil proceeding and abuse of process, Instructions 16 & 19. (Rec. 617 & 620,
respectively). Spencer's counsel complained about Instruction 16, that the dismissal by
Judge Dawson of the alienation of affection claim was not based on the merits of the case
and did not mean that the action was improperly filed, but that it was only dismissed as a
discovery sanction. (Rec. 1199, pg. 553).
Instruction 16 attempts to set forth the elements that Spencer must prove in
order to prevail on his alienation of affection claim. (Rec. 617). It requires that Spencer
prove that: (1) he and his wife, Jewelya were happily married and had a genuine love for
each other, (2) that the love and affection so existing was alienated and destroyed, (3) and
that Nielsen made willful, intentional, wrongful, and malicious acts toward Jewelya,
which were the controlling or effective cause that brought about the loss and alienation of
such love and affection. (Rec. 617). In reality, the jury was being asked not to determine
if Spencer had probable cause to file his alienation of affection claim, but rather to
determine the underlying case, i.e., whether Nielsen was the "controlling cause" of the
alienation of affection between Spencer and Jewelya.
Spencer's counsel also objected to Instruction 19 and complained that the
list of items (particularly when standing alone) did not constitute a wrongful use of the
civil proceedings. (Rec. 1199, pg. 544-546). The trial court denied his objections saying
one was sufficient, and it was a matter for the jury to decide. (Rec. 1199, pg. 454-546).
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After trial, the jury found in favor of Nielsen and against Spencer, using a
Special Verdict form, the jury awarded Nielsen $95,000.00 on his wrongful use of civil
proceeding claim. (Rec. 640-641) The jury also found in favor of Nielsen on his abuse of
process claim, but did not award any damages under this claim. No punitive damages
were awarded. (Rec. 640-641).
After the Special Verdict was returned, a Judgment on Special Verdict was
prepared (Rec. 955-958), it provided for prejudgment interest on the $95,000.00 damage
award, from September 20, 2001, to the date of the Verdict, in an amount of $44,333.36.
(Rec. 958, f 6). Spencer filed an objection to this, arguing that there should be no prejudgment interest awarded, without a statute or contract. (Rec. 962 & 965, If 1). Nielsen
filed a response to Spencer's objections (Rec. 969-991), arguing that the $95,000.00
amount awarded, was the amount Nielsen had asked for his attorneys' fees in defending
the alienation of affection case, and apparently the jury accepted this amount. (Rec. 971).
Nielsen also filed an Amended Proposed Judgment on Special Verdict (Rec. 987-990),
increasing the amount of prejudgment interest to $86,447.86, by dating it back to May 3,
1996, the date Spencer filed his alienation of affection lawsuit. (Rec. 990, f 6). Also for
the first time Nielsen claimed that he was entitled to prejudgment interest on the damage
award, based on 78-27-44 U.CA. (Rec. 971). Spencer responded, arguing that 78-27-44
U.CA. was not applicable in this case, and even if it was, Nielsen should not be awarded
prejudgment interest back to May 3, 1996, because Nielsen's cause of action could not
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have arisen until the alienation of affection claim was dismissed in 2001. (Rec. 993).
A hearing was held on August 29, 2006. (Rec. 1026). After the hearing the
parties submitted additional cases. On November 30, 2006, the trial court issued its
Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion For Prejudgment Interest and Costs. (Rec. 1096-1100). The
trial court ruled that Nielsen was entitled to prejudgment interest on the damages as
provided in 78-27-44 UCA. (Rec. 1096). The trial court further ruled that the $95,000.00
amount awarded constituted "special damages" for purposes of 78-27-44, citing Rule 9(g)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Rec. 1098). The trial court however, did not allow
prejudgment interest back to May 3, 1996, but ruled that since the cause of action did not
accrue until the alienation of affection action was terminated in 2001, Nielsen was only
entitled to prejudgment interest from the date of termination in 2001. (Rec. 1098).
On December 29, 2006, the trial court entered a Second Amended Proposed
Judgment on Special Verdict. (Rec. 1101-1104). On January 5, 2007, Spencer filed a
Motion for New Trial (Rec. 1106) arguing: that the alienation of affection claim was not
brought without probable cause; that is was not dismissed on the merits; that there was no
wrongful use of the civil proceeding in the alienation of affection action; that the jury was
not properly instructed, and that the court's interpretation of the Special Verdict form, i.e.,
that the $95,000.00 amount awarded as general damages for attorneys' fees, constituted
"special damages" under 78-27-44 U.C.A., for medical bills actually incurred, was in
error and contrary to the law. (Rec. 1109-1114).
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The trial court denied Spencer's Motion for New Trial. Its Order Denying
Defendant's Motion for New Trial, was entered on May 1, 2007. (Rec. 1189-1192). On
May 25, 2007, Spencer filed his Notice of Appeal. (Rec. 1193).
Statement of Facts:
1.

Nielsen filed his Complaint in this action on December 18, 2001,

alleging two causes of action: wrongful bringing of civil proceedings; and abuse of
process. (Rec. 1-7).
2.

Nielsen claimed that Spencer's alienation of affection claim was

brought against him without probable cause, because Spencer knew his wife never loved
him and because he knew that he could not prevail on his alienation of affection claim
against Nielsen. (Rec. 2 ^ 8).
3.

In his wrongful bringing of civil proceedings claim, Nielsen

alleges that on or about April 3, 2001, Spencer's alienation of affection claim against
Nielsen was dismissed as a sanction for failing to comply with discovery requirements.
(Rec. 3, If 9).
4.

Nielsen sought damages under his wrongful bringing of civil

proceeding claim, for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending the alienation of
affection suit, attorneys' fees incurred in pursuing his lawsuit, lost earnings and benefits,
loss of employment time, emotional distress, mental pain and suffering, medical
expenses, and other expenses, to be determined according to proof; and other
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consequential damages to be determined according to proof. (Rec. 3, ^ 10).
5.

In his abuse of process claim, Nielsen alleges that Spencer engaged

in persistent and dilatory tactics intending to frustrate the judicial process during
discovery of the alienation of affection action when he failed to produce certain
documents. (Rec. 4, f 14). Nielsen alleges that Spencer attempted to harass and
embarrass Nielsen and cause him to incur additional expense and time by the following
actions: (a) attempting take the depositions of Nielsen's mother and wife, (b) causing
crucial evidence to be lost or stolen, (c) misrepresenting facts to mislead Nielsen from
possible defenses, and to force Nielsen to incur additional time and expense, (d) engaging
in delay tactics causing Nielsen to incur additional attorneys' fees, (e) designating
numerous witnesses to force Nielsen to do exhaustive investigative work causing him to
incur additional attorneys' fees and expense, (f) and attempting to influence other
witnesses to misstate the facts. (Rec. 5, ^f 17).
6.

Nielsen sought damages under his abuse of process claim for

attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending the alienation of affection claim,
attorneys' fees incurred in pursuing his lawsuit against Spencer, lost earnings and
benefits, loss of employment time, emotional distress, mental pain and suffering, medical
expenses, and other expenses, to be determined according to proof; and other
consequential damages to be determined according to proof. (Rec. 6, f 18). Nielsen
further sought an award of punitive damages. (Rec. 6, f 20).
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7.

The case was tried before a jury on June 7, 8, & 9, 2007. The first

witness called was Jewelya. (Rec. 1200, Trans, pg. 35). She testified that she married
Spencer on September 30, 1981.(Rec. 1200, Pg. 37). She testified that she worked hard
to make her marriage with Spencer, work. (Rec. 1200, Pg. 40). She didn't want a
divorce, she wanted to correct the problems in their marriage. (Rec. 1200, Pg. 41). She
didn't ever want a divorce. (Rec. 1200, pg. 43).
8.

At this time Jewelya was contacted by Nielsen, a high school

boyfriend. Jewelya and Nielsen had been sexually active in high school. (Rec. 1200,
pgs.51-52) Jewelya and Nielsen continued to meet and Nielsen began an intimate sexual
relationship with Jewelya, knowing that she was married to Spencer. (Rec. 1200, pg. 53).
9.

As a result of Nielsen's sexual relations with Jewelya, twin girls

were born, Brooklyn and Danielle. (Rec. 1200, pg. 53). Jewelya suspected that the
children belonged to Nielsen, but did not tell Spencer. (Rec. 1200, pg. 53). She
eventually told Spencer about her sexual relationship with Nielsen. (Rec. 1200, pg. 55).
She told Spencer that the girls, Brooklyn and Danielle, belonged to Nielsen and not to
him. (Rec. 1200, pg. 56). She told Spencer this when the children were approximately 18
months old. (Rec. 1200, pg. 57). Blood tests were done on the children approximately 6
months later, which confirmed that the children belonged to Nielsen, and not to Spencer.
(Rec. 1200, pg. 57). After this time, Nielsen continued his sexual relationship with
Jewelya. (Rec. 1200, pg. 58).
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10.

Some time after this, Jewelya received a call from a woman, Shauna

Thompson, who claimed that she had had a sexual encounter with Spencer. Jewelya
wasn't shocked or angry about the call. (Rec. 1200, pg. 59) She knew first hand, "how
something like that could happen, when you didn't mean it to." (Rec. 1200, pg. 60).
11.

Shuana Thompson claimed to have a tape recording of a

conversation she had with Spencer regarding the encounter. (Rec. 1200, pg. 61). Jewelya
met with Thompson to obtain the tape, which she did; and then she destroyed the tape.
(Rec.l200,pg63).
12.

Shuana Thompson's husband sued both Spencer and Jewelya for

alienation of affection; and Jewelya filed a counterclaim against Shauna for alienation of
affection, abuse of process and false imprisonment. (Rec. 1200, pg. 66). This lawsuit was
settled for $4,500.00. (Rec. 1200, pgs. 68 & 386)
13.

After Jewelya told Spencer about her sexual relationship with

Nielsen and that the girls belonged to Nielsen; Nielsen continued his sexual relationship
with Jewelya. (Rec. 1200, pg. 70). A paternity suit was filed against Nielsen and an
agreement was reached in the paternity action requiring support payments from Nielsen
for the twin girls. (Rec. 1200, pg. 112).
14.

After this time in late 1995, Nielsen met Jewelya in Southern

California. Soon after this, Jewelya and Spencer separated in January of 1996 (Rec.
1200, pg. 85), and in March of 1996, Jewelya filed for divorce. (Rec. 1200, pg. 71).
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15.

Jewelya testified that Lorenzo did not want a divorce. (Rec. 1200,

pg. 72). Even when he made threats of a divorce, she knew that he was not serious, and it
was only an attempt to get her to behave. (Rec. 1200, pg. 98).
16.

The next day of trial, Lorenzo Spencer testified. Spencer testified

that he went to marriage counseling on and off with Jewelya. (Rec. 1201, pg. 178). That
they would sometimes separate to cool down (Rec. 1201, pg. 182); and that one time they
stayed separated for a month. (Rec. 1201, pg. 179).
17.

Spencer testified that there was no physical abuse during the

marriage (Rec. 1201, pg. 183), but that he did hold Jewelya's arms down one time to stop
her from throwing things. (Rec. 1201, pg. 185).
18.

Spencer testified that he did have one sexual encounter with Shauna

Thompson, after he learned of Jewelya's onging sexual relationship with Nielsen. (Rec.
1201, pg. 195-196). Spencer was told by Dr. Taylor Hartman, that this might make him
feel better, but he did not blame the encounter on Dr. Hartman. (Rec. 1201, pg.195).
19.

Spencer testified that after he learned of Nielsen's sexual relations

with his wife, he inquired as to whether she had had sexual relations with other male
friends and acquaintances. (Rec. 1201, pgs. 200-207)
20.

Spencer testified that he was involved in a number of lawsuits as a

landlord, involving minor landlord tenant disputes (Rec. 1201, pg. 207), and one
department store, Z.C.M.I., collecting on Jewelya's charge card. (Rec. 1201, pg. 208).
Nielsen introduced this evidence to show other stress in Spencer and Jewelya's marriage,
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which he did not create. (Rec. 1201, pg. 208).
21.

Spencer testified that his lawsuit against Nielsen for alienation of

affection was dismissed because of his counsel's failure to produce discovery regarding
these lawsuits. He testified that he provided the discovery to counsel, but his counsel
failed to produce it. (Rec. 1201, pg. 239). The Order granting summary judgment was
admitted as Trial Ex. 53, and read into court, it states "the court specifically finds that
there is just cause under Rule 37(B)(2)(c) to dismiss the plaintiffs cause of action for
alienation of affection and all punitive damages." (Rec. 1201, pg. 241). The Order further
says, "[A]ll of which frustrated the judicial process and impeded trial on the merits and
made it impossible or much more difficult to ascertain whether the allegations of
plaintiffs complaint had any factual merit." (Rec. 1201, pg. 242).
22.

After learning of Nielsen's sexual relations with his wife, Spencer

testified that he approached Nielsen at work to meet with him about the situation, and
made a tape recording of their conversation. (Rec. 1201, pg. 245). Spencer told him to
leave his wife alone, aad that he would pursue him and sue, if he didn't leave his wife and
family alone. (Rec. 1201, pg. 246).
23.

In Spencer's alienation of affection lawsuit against Nielsen, Spencer

disclosed the existence of the tape, and indicated in discovery that the tape would be
duplicated and produced. (Rec. 1201, pg. 248). However, the tape was never found and
was never produced. (Rec. 1201, pgs. 248-249).
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24.

In Spencer's alienation of affection lawsuit against Nielsen, Nadine

Nielsen, his mother, and Lorrie Nielsen, his wife, were subpoenaed as deposition
witnesses. Nielsen's lawyer complained that the mother was too old, that she had health
problems, and that neither her nor the wife, had any information relevant to the case.
(Rec. 1201, pg. 257-258). A motion to strike the subpoena was filed and granted.
25.

Spencer testified that he thought Nadine Nielsen, Mr. Nielsen's

mother and Lorrie Nielsen, his wife, would have discoverable information. Spencer talked
to Nadine Nielsen in a ShopKo parking lot and she said that she had told Mike to leave
Jewelya alone. (Rec. 1201, pg. 414). Spencer thought that she and Nielsen's wife, would
have information about Nielsen's affair with Spencer's wife, such as whether they knew
about it, when they found out, how long it had been going on, Nielsen's activities at the
time, and those types of things. (Rec. 1201, pg. 374). Once Nielsen's attorney objected
and the court ruled that Spencer's attorney could not depose them. Spencer and his
attorney complied with the court's order and did not depose Nielsen's mother or wife.
(Rec. 1201, pg. 374-375).
26.

In the alienation of affection case, Spencer's counsel listed the

couple's entire Bountiful L.D.S. ward, as persons who may have possible information or
may be used as a character witnesses. (Rec. 1201, pg. 260). As the case proceeded to
trial, and before the final disclosure of witnesses for trial, the number was to be whittled
down. (Rec. 1201, pg. 260).
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27.

At trial Nielsen's counsel tried to get Spencer to admit, that based on

the extra-marital affairs, infidelity on both sides, and accusations of physical abuse (while
denied by Spencer); Spencer understood in his own heart and mind that he really did not
have a happy marriage in May of 1996, when he filed his alienation of affection suit
against Nielsen. This accusation was denied by Spencer. (Rec. 1201, pg. 262).
28.

Spencer testified that they were still trying to keep their marriage

together, that in his heart he really wanted the marriage to work, that he had loved his
wife for 15 years, and they had children that depended on them, (Rec. 1201, pg. 373).
29.

In regards to the missing audio tape of Spencer's conversation with

Nielsen, Spencer testified that he thought he knew where the tape was when he answered
the discovery; but he could not find it after searching through boxes and boxes of tapes.
He would frequently record not only his own speeches, but speeches of other people (Rec.
1201, pg. 377); and there had been several moves. (Rec. 1201, pg. 378).
30.

In regards to the discovery sanction in the alienation of affection

case, this had to do with lawsuits that were filed involving Spencer, which Nielsen's
attorney confronted him about in his deposition. (Rec. 1201, pg. 381). These lawsuits are
not sealed and are a matter of public record. At the time of the deposition, Mr. Nielsen'
attorney indicated that he could and would obtain those records on his own. (Rec. 1201,
pg. 381). He knew about the lawsuits during Spencer's deposition. (Rec. 1201, pg. 382).
31.

Spencer testified that he did not file his action against Nielsen to

cause him distress or to cause him to incur large legal expenses. (Rec. 1201, pg. 383).
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The lawsuit filed by the Thompsons for alienation of affection was settled for a mere
$4,500.00. (Rec. 1201, pg. 386). Spencer loved his wife and he wanted the marriage to
work. (Rec. 1201, pg. 373).
32.

Nielsen also testified at trial. He testified that he was sexually

intimate with Jewelya during high school. (Rec. 1199, pg. 419). After Nielsen learned
that Jewelya and Lorenzo lived across the street from where he got his haircut, he
initiated contact with Jewelya by buying her a birthday card and putting it in their
mailbox. (Rec. 1199, pgs. 421-422). This lead to a phone call from Jewelya and Nielsen
soon met Jewelya for lunch. (Rec. 1199, pg. 422).
33.

Nielsen testified that he and Jewelya continued to have lunches (Rec.

1199, pg. 423); and then they met at a hotel and they were sexually intimate. (Rec. 1199,
pg. 425). Nielsen admitted at trial that he went too far. He had free will. He didn't
blame Jewelya, but accepted full responsibility for his actions. (Rec. 1199, pg. 426).
34.

Nielsen further testified that he was sexually involved with Jewelya

at least a dozen times over a period of two, three, or more, years. (Rec. 1199, pg. 426).
He testified that he had sexual relations with her after it was learned that he was the father
of the twin girls. (Rec. 1199, pg. 427) He also testified that he continued his sexual
relations with Jewelya, after Spencer knew the twins belonged Nielsen. (Rec. 1199, pg.
427). The sexual relations continued because Nielsen was "pretty needy in that regard "
(Rec. 1199, pg. 428), but Nielsen believed and knew, that it was a mistake. (Reel 199, pg.
428).
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35.

Nielsen testified that it was his wife, Lorrie who pushed to have tests

done to determine if the twin girls belonged to Nielsen. She is the one who said, "I've got
to know, we can't go on like this." (Rec. 1199, pg. 428). Therefore, Nielsen did talk to
his wife about his sexual relations with Jewelya and Nielsen's wife did have relevant
information about the case. (Rec. 1199, pg. 428). Nielsen's wife also went to counseling
with Nielsen to discuss the matter, how to resolve it, how to reveal it to the twins, and
when. (Rec. 1199, pg. 429).
36.

After the twins were born, Nielsen did have visitation, and the twins

would be taken to his mother's house, Nadine Nielsen. Jewelya wanted the twins to feel
that Nadine was their grandmother. (Rec. 1199, pg. 430). Therefore, Nielsen's mother
did have relevant information about the case and that Nielsen had fathered twins with
Jewelya. Nielsen never told the twins that he was their father, he doesn't know who told
them. (Rec. 1199, pg. 430).
37.

Later in 1995 Nielsen met Jeweyla in Southern California and they

spent two days together and the last night at his hotel. (Rec. 1199, pg. 431-432) Although
Nielsen claimed that nothing sexual happened, he admitted that they were intimate, that it
didn't look good, and that it shouldn't have happened. (Rec. 1199, pg. 432).
38.

Nielsen testified that it was after his California rendevous with

Jewelya that Spencer confronted him at his office in the latter part of 1995 or early 1996.
(Rec. 1199, pg.433). Nielsen claimed that in their discussion he said he knew the
California rendevous looked bad, but nothing sexual happened. He then said that he and
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Spencer discussed other times when Nielsen and Jewelya had been sexually intimate,
without telling Spencer. (Rec. 1199, pg. 434). In this conversation Nielsen claimed that
Spencer told him that if he didn't leave his wife alone, he would come after Nielsen and
make his life miserable. (Rec. 1199, pg. 435).
39.

Nielsen testified that the alienation of affection lawsuit that Spencer

filed against him, supposedly to harass him, laid dormant for a couple of years. (Rec.
1199, pg. 439). Nielsen testified that he paid his first attorney, Tom Branch $8,000.00,
and Henriksen & Henriksen $87,483.42, to defend the alienation of affection lawsuit.
(Rec. 1199, pg. 440). Nielsen also testified that in the current lawsuit he had incurred
$55,966.00, with an additional $10,000 likely after trial. (Rec. 1199, pg. 441).
40.

Nielsen testified that he lost about 7 days a year, 8 hours a day at

$30.00 an hour for a total of $8,400.00 over 5 years, in defending the alienation of
affection lawsuit. (Rec. 1199, pg. 442); and $7,560.00 in pursuing his case against
Spencer. (Rec. 1199, pg. 443).
41.

Nielsen testified that he did not seek any medical treatment and did

not have any claim for medical expenses against Spencer. (Rec. 1199, pg. 444). Nielsen
testified at trial, that to the best of his knowledge, his wife knew nothing about his
relationship with Jewelya prior to June of '90, and that he did not tell his mother about his
encounters with Jewelya. (Rec. 1199, pg. 444). He testified that his mother had health
problems and when his mother was served with papers, she didn't understand what it was
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all about, and she was very upset. (Rec. 1199, pg. 444).
42.

Nielsen testified that he sought a court order preventing Spencer

from proceeding with discovery or deposing his wife or mother. The court granted his
motion, and afterwards there was no violation of the order, or any attempt by Spencer to
depose Nielsen's wife or mother. (Rec. 1199, pg. 445).
43.

On cross-examination, Nielsen again confirmed that he had had a

sexual relationship with Jewelya and continued to have an ongoing sexual relationship
with her. (Rec. 1199, pg. 455). That Jewelya became pregnant and delivered twins (Rec.
1199, pg. 455), and after this time, he continued to have ongoing sexual relations with
her. (Rec. 1199, pg. 456). Sometimes in a vehicle, sometimes in a motel or hotel. (Rec.
1199, pg. 462). He felt terrible after the first time, but he continued to do it. (Rec. 1199,
pg. 462).
44.

Nielsen on cross-examination read from his deposition where he

indicated that it was right after June of 1990 he spoke with Spencer about the affair and
fathering the children; and it was him who wanted to meet with Spencer, but Spencer did
not want to meet. (Rec. 1199, pg. 459).
45.

Nielsen admitted that he had visitation with the children at his

mother's home, and that his mother told him to stay away from Jewelya, and she did not
approve of his relationship with Jewelya. (Rec. 1199, pgs. 463-464). His mother knew
about the situation, but Spencer was not allowed to take her deposition to find out what
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else she knew. (Rec. 1199, pg. 464).
46.

Nielsen testified that he did not have sex with Jewelya in Southern

California in July of 1995, but he admitted that he had intimate contact with her at that
time. (Rec. 1199,pg. 465).
47.

Nielsen further testified that his relationship with Jewelya did cause

damage to Jewelya and Lorenzo's marriage. "It wasn't a good thing." (Rec. 1199, pg.
465). Nielsen further conceded that the revelation that he was the father of the twins,
would have caused further stress and damage to the marriage. (Rec. 1199, pg. 466). And
the fact he continued to have sexual relations with Jewelya, also would have caused stress
and damage to the marriage. (Rec. 1199, pg. 466).
48.

When the alienation of affection lawsuit was dismissed by Judge

Dawson, Nielsen sought his attorneys' fees at that time, but the Judge refused stating,
"I'm going to dismiss this, but you know, dismissal is enough, I'm not going to award
you any attorneys' fees. If Mr. Spencer appeals and the case comes back then I will take
a look at the attorneys' fees." (Rec. 1199, pg. 468-469).
49.

Nielsen conceded that Spencer did not know what Nielsen's wife

knew about the affair and that Spencer may have wanted to find out what she knew about
it. (Rec. 1199, pg. 470). Nielsen also admitted that he also listed dozens of witnesses in
his discovery answers in the alienation of affection case, many of the same witnesses
listed by Spencer. (Rec. 1199, pg. 470).
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50.

Nielsen testified that he has never told the twins that he is their father

and that he does not discuss that with them. He realizes that Spencer would have bonded
with the twins before learning that he was not their true father. (Rec. 1199, pg. 473).
51.

Spencer was later called on his own case, and testified that at least

once a month when he traveled he would take Jewelya with him to places like: San Diego,
San Fransico, Los Angeles, Phoenix, Dallas, Philadelphia, New York, Australia, Victoria
Island, Vancouver; and Southern Florida, Ft. Lauderdale, Miami, and Tampa. (Rec. 1199,
pg. 496) He also took her to Hawaii and Acapulco and Cancun, with a nanny to watch
the children. (Rec. 1199, pg. 497).
52.

Spencer further testified that he never told Jewelya that he didn't

want to be married to her in this life, let alone forever; but that he wanted them to prepare
to go to the L.D.S temple to have their marriage sealed forever. (Rec. 1199, pg. 498).
53.

Spencer testified that one of the twins, Brooklyn had an eye

condition, a cataract; and needed surgery. (Rec. 1199, pg. 498). Spencer was contacted
by the doctor about giving blood prior to the surgery; and was told by Jewelya at that
time, that he might not be the father. (Rec. 1199, pg. 498).
54.

Spencer testified that regardless as to whether his encounter with

Nielsen regarding his wife occurred in 1990 or 1995, he did not purposely destroy the
tape recording of their conversation. (Rec. 1199, pg. 502). He thought he had it and he
spent hours looking for it, but couldn't find it. It is possible that it was inadvertently
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recorded over. (Rec. 1199, pg. 502). He had also moved several times. (Rec. 1201, pg.
378)
55.

Spencer admitted in his testimony that he and Jewelya did not have a

perfect marriage, but that they loved each other very much prior to Nielsen's involvement
and that they were anticipating going to the temple and have their marriage sealed and
their children sealed to them. (Rec. 1199, pg. 503).
56.

Spencer admitted in his testimony that he was mad the night Jewelya

told him about Nielsen and that he did call Nielsen that same night to ask him why. (Rec.
1199, pg. 504). Nielsen was mad at Jewelya for telling Spencer saying they had an
agreement they weren't going to tell. (Rec. 1199, pg. 505) Spencer further admitted that
he may have called Nielsen a name and threatened a lawsuit, if Nielsen did not leave his
wife alone. (Rec. 1199, pg. 505).
57.

Spencer testified that it was like getting hit in the gut with a baseball

bat, to look at your two little girls and know that they're not yours, that you're not their
real father. (Rec. 1199, pg. 505).
58.

Spencer testified that he never mentioned anything about how much

money he made to Nielsen. He never said that he would bury him at any cost. And he
never said he didn't care if he won a lawsuit or not. (Rec. 1199, pg. 506).
59.

Spencer testified that he made Jewelya promise him that she would

no longer see Nielsen and that when he saw the children he would do so under certain
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arrangements and restrictions and that she was not to remain with him and the children.
(Rec. 1199, pg. 507).
60.

Spencer testified that when he learned of Nielsen's rendevous with

Jewelya in Southern California in 1995, he was devastated. (Rec. 1199, pg. 508).
61.

Spencer testified that after Jewelya divorced him they had

problems, because Jewelya would deny him visitation of his children. Jewelya went to
jail several times for denying visitation. (Rec. 1199, pg.510). Spencer did not want to see
her in jail, but only wanted to see his children. (Rec. 1199, pg. 512). Eventually there was
a custody change ordered in the divorce proceeding, changing custody of one of their
children, Colton, to Spencer. (Rec. 1199, pg. 512).
62.

Spencer testified that the main reason his marriage with Jeweyla

failed was because of the constant affair between Nielsen and Jewelya. (Rec. 1199, pg.
513) Nielsen had destroyed his marriage, his family, and his life. Spencer had lost his
marriage, his home, the association with his wife and children. Everything he had
dreamed of when he married Jewelya in the first place, was lost. That is why he filed his
alienation of affection claim. (Rec. 1199, pg. 514).
63.

After testimony, in reviewing the jury instructions, Spencer's

attorney objected to Instruction No. 19, regarding the elements for abuse of process, (Rec.
620) particularly paragraph 2, and the list of items that followed. The court denied the
objection, and received Ihe instruction. (Rec. 1199, pg. 544). The court stated, "[i]t
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certainly is argument but they've got to find some of that and those are the only issues
that have been raised relative to ways in which they abuse process. So they've got to find
that one of those." (Rec. 1199, pg. 545). Spencer's counsel raised the question as to
whether one of them is enough and the court responded, "[i]t is if they think it is. I say
one or more. One may be. That's something you can argue to them. That's a question of
whether it is. It may be. (Rec. 1199, pg. 545).
64.

The court compared the case to a negligence case stating, "first of all

you've got to file the civil process against the defendant, that he used the civil process for
a purpose other than that for which it was intended in one or more ways - all he's got to
find one way. (Rec. 1199, pg. 545, lines 19-22) To which, Spencer's counsel responded,
"[a]ctually abuse of process he has to show that the process that was filed was
inappropriate. My client wasn't married or they didn't have that kind of thing." (Rec.
1199, pg. 545, lines 23-25) To which the court said, "not really." The objections were
denied. (Rec. 1199, pg. 547, lines 1 & 12).
65.

Spencer's counsel also objected to Instruction No. 16, and

complained that Judge Dawson did not dismiss the alienation of affection case because it
was a bad faith filing, but rather it was dismissed because of the failure to comply with
discovery orders. (Rec. 1199, pg. 553, lines 12-15).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The dismissal of the underlying action, that Spencer brought against Nielsen
for alienation of affection, as a discovery sanction under Rule 37(b)(2)(C) does not
establish that the underlying action was brought "without probable cause," in order to
sustain a claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings. Gilbert v. Ince, 981 P.2d 841 (Utah
1999). Furthermore, the lack of probable cause, is a question of law for the court to
determine, not the jury.1 Id. In addition, the dismissal of the underlying action as a
discovery sanction, does not constitute a termination "on the merits," in order to sustain a
claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings. Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774 (Ut.App. 2004)
affd 147 P.3d 383 (Utah 2006). Furthermore, the question as to whether a matter has
been determined on the merits is a question of law for the court to decide, not the jury.
Palmer Development Corp. v. Gordon, 723 A.2d 881 (Me. 1999), Restatement (Second)
Torts, Section 673).
Spencer's alleged conduct in the alienation of affection action, as listed in
Jury Instruction 19, (Rec. 620) do not (particularly when standing alone) constitute, "a
willful act in the use of the process, not proper in the regular course of the proceeding,"
sufficient to sustain a claim for abuse of process. Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774 (Ut.App.
2004) affd 147 P.3d 383 (Utah 2006). Furthermore, while the question of an ulterior
purpose should be a question of fact for the jury, the question as to what constitutes a
1

Moreover, the jury in this case was never asked to determine if there was
probable cause to file the alienation of affection claim, but rather the jury was asked to
determine whether Nielsen was the controlling cause of the alienation of affection.
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"willful act in the use of the process, not proper in the regular course of the proceeding,"
should be a question of law for the court, and not for the jury to decide. Id.
The special damage provision of Section 78-27-44 U.C.A., allowing
prejudgment interest on "special damages" actually incurred for medical treatment,
should not apply in this case, where the recovery is a general damage award for attorneys'
fees incurred in defending the underlying action on a wrongful use of civil proceeding
claim. Particularly when the amount and reasonableness of the fee was not determined
until trial by the jury. Furthermore, "special damages" under Section 78-27-44 U.C.A.,
are not the same as special damages as far as pleading requirements are concerned.
Gleave v. Denver Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 749 P.2d 660 (Ut.App. 1988). They
are limited in scope to expenses paid to those who are injured so they can receive
immediate medical and hospital care, if necessary. Id. at 672, reviewing Senate Bill 153
and legislative history of Section 78-27-44 U.C.A. In this case, Nielsen specifically
testified that he did not seek medical treatment and had no claim for any medical
expenses against Spencer. (Rec. 1199, pg. 444).
Finally, the trial court's interpretation of the Special Verdict form, that the
amount of $95,000.00 awarded is not general damages, but rather all "special damages"
under Section 78-27-44 U.C.A., with no general damages being awarded; is contrary to
the law and the requirement that there must be an award of general damages, before there
can be any special damages awarded for personal injury torts. Balderas v. Starks, 138
P.3d 75 (Ut.App. 2006).
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE UNDERLYING ACTION WAS NOT BROUGHT
"WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE" TO SUSTAIN A
CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL USE OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
In Gilbert v. Ince, 981 P.2d 841 (Utah 1999), the Utah Supreme Court held

that the claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings required (1) use of the proceedings
without "probable cause," and primarily for a purpose other than that a securing the
proper adjudication of justice; and (2) except in ex parte actions, the proceedings are
terminated in favor of the person against whom they were brought, (emphasis added).
(Restatement (Second) Torts, Section 674).
The Utah Supreme Court in Gilbert v. Ince, supra, cited Baird v.
Intermountain School Federal Credit Union, 555 P.2d 877 (Utah 1976) stating that the
claim for the wrongful use of civil proceeding is recognized only when the civil suit is
shown to have been brought without probable cause, and it is usually said to require
malice. Id. at 878 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court in Gilbert thus held, that
Gilbert had the obligation to prove that Ince acted without probable cause. Id. at 846.
The Court in Gilbert cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts in defining
"probable cause" in the context of a wrongful use of civil proceeding claim, as follows:
On who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation or procurement of
civil proceedings against another has probable cause for doing so if he [or she]
reasonably believes in the existence of the facts upon which the claim is based, and
correctly or reasonably believes that under those fact the claim may be valid
under the applicable law. Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 675, fn 9.
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In this case, Spencer had a reasonable believe in the underlying facts upon
which his claim for alienation of affection was based. Nielsen had an affair with
Spencer's wife, Jewelya, and fathered two children with Jewelya, while she was married
to Spencer. In deed, these underlying facts were admitted by both Nielsen and Jewelya at
trial. (Rec. 1199, pgs. 455-457, and Rec. 1200, pgs. 53-58, respectively). Therefore, there
can be no doubt, but that Spencer had a reasonable belief in these underlying facts; and
neither the court nor the jury, could reasonably find that Spencer lacked "probable cause"
to bring his alienation of affection claim against Nielsen.2 Based on these undisputed
facts, the trial court should have ruled, as a matter of law, that Spencer did not lack the
probable cause necessary to file his claim for alienation of affection.
The questions is whether the party bringing the action has "probable cause"
or a reasonable belief in the facts upon which the claim is based. Id. It is not necessary,
and it should not be required, that the party bringing the action believe for a certainty that
he will ultimately prevail on his claim, under the law. Particularly, since the lay person
relying on the facts he reasonably believes to be true, is not trained in the law.3 It is only

2

Of course the jury in the underlying action (if it had not been dismissed for
discovery reasons) would have been able to determine if Nielsen's conduct was the
controlling cause of the alienation, for Spencer to prevail in that case; but that
determination is different than the question of probable cause to file, which was at issue
in this case.
3

Spencer's counsel was correct at trial, when he pointed out to the judge, that for
Nielsen to prevail he would have to show that Spencer's belief in the underlying facts was
not reasonable, i.e. that Spencer was not married to Jewelya or that nothing happened to
make Spencer reasonably believe that there was an affair, or that kind of thing going on.
(Rec. 1199, pg. 545).
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relying on the facts he reasonably believes to be true, is not trained in the law.3 It is only
required that he believes that under those facts the claim may be valid under the
applicable law. Id. at 846. Spencer's claim for alienation of affection may have been
valid under the law based upon the facts he believed to be true, and which were proven
true at trial. Nielsen had a sexual relationship with Spencer's wife, during their marriage
and fathered two children. The jury in the alienation of affection case based on these
facts, could have easily determined that Nielsen was the controlling cause of the
alienation of affection in their marriage.4 Therefore, Spencer had probable cause to file
his alienation of affection claim.
Furthermore, the question of probable cause should have been decided by
the court as a legal question and not left to the jury. In Gilbert v. Ince, 981 P.2d 841
(Utah 1999) the Utah Supreme Court noted that the Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 68 IB, delineates the responsibilities of the court and the jury in such cases,5 but
because the case was decided on a directed verdict, the Court did not address the proper

3

Spencer's counsel was correct at trial, when he pointed out to the judge, that for
Nielsen to prevail he would have to show that Spencer's belief in the underlying facts was
not reasonable, i.e. that Spencer was not married to Jewelya or that nothing happened to
make Spencer reasonably believe that there was an affair, or that kind of thing going on.
(Rec. 1199, pg. 545).
4

The fact that Judge Dawson dismissed the alienation of affection claim as a
discovery sanction does not mean that the sexual affair by Nielsen did not occur, or that it
could not have been the controlling factor in the alienation of affection case.
5

§681B provides that it is the function of the court to determine whether the
defendant had probable cause for his action. (See complete Restatement (Second) of
Torts, § 68IB attached in Addendum as Exhibit E).
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existed is a question for the court and is distinguishable from the jury's role in finding
probable cause in negligence cases); and Weststar Mortg. Corp. v. Jackson, 61 P.3d 823,
832 (N.M. 2002)(probable cause is a question of law to be decided by trial judge, and trial
court erred in submitting this legal determination to the jury). See also, Robb v. United
States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 798 F.2d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 1986); Williams v. Coombs, 179
CaLApp. 3d 626 (1986); Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal.3d 863 (1989); and
Prewittv. Sexton, 111 S.W.2d. 891 (Ky. 1989).
This issue should now be addressed on appeal, and this court should follow
Restatement §68 IB and the line of cases holding that it's the responsibility of the court to
determine the existence of probable cause in such cases, and not the jury. The court is in a
better position to determine if probable cause exists to support a legal claim. If there are
issues of fact in dispute the court needs resolved to make this determination, the jury can
be called upon to resolve those factual issues, as provided for in Restatement
§681B(2)(a). However, the ultimate determination is up to the court; and when sufficient
facts are undisputed, as in this case, to establish probable cause, the court should find
probable cause as a matter of law. Weststar Mortg. Corp. v. Jackson, 61 P.3d 823, 832
(N.M. 2002)(where there is no evidence to dispute probable cause, the trial court should
determine probable cause as a mater of law). Based on the undisputed facts in this case,
Spencer clearly had probable cause to bring his alienation of affection claim against
Nielsen; and the court should have determined, as a matter of law, that Spencer had
probable cause to bring his claim for alienation of affection against Nielsen. Id. at 832.
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Plain Error and Exceptional Circumstances. Whether the prior dismissal
based on discovery meant the matter was filed without probable cause was raised at trial
by Spencer's counsel. (Rec. pgs. 544-554) If not properly raised, the matter should still
be considered by this court under the principles of plain error and/or exceptional
circumstances. To demonstrate plain error a party must establish that (i) an error exits (ii)
the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993). As stated above there was an error in this case because
probable cause was present. Therefore, the first element is met. Second, the trial court
should have known that based on the admitted facts and extra-marital affair by Nielsen,
that Spencer had probable cause for his alienation of affection claim. Finally, the error
made was harmful, as the court should have determined that Spencer had probable cause
to bring his alienation of affection claim. Absent the error, the outcome of the case would
have been much more favorable for Spencer. State v. Evans, 20 P.3d 888 (Utah 2001).
If not plain error, the court should still review the matter on appeal based on
the exceptional circumstances. Exceptional circumstances have been recognized where
there has been a new development or clarification in the law. State v. Haston, 846 P.2d
1276 (Utah 1995); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). In this case the law was
not clear, as the Utah Supreme Court did not previously address the differing
responsibilities of the court and the jury in determining probable cause at the time of trial
in such cases. Gilbert v. Ince, supra, footnote 13.
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Finally, an exception to the preservation rule is recognized when the issue
raised is solely a question of law, and it is based on admitted facts. Pankratz Implement
Co. v. Citizens Nat Bank, 130 P.3d 57 (Kan. 2006); Jones v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303 (Kan
1994); Nutt v. Knutson, 795 P.2d 30 (Kan. 1989). In this case the existence of probable
cause is present based on admitted facts, and its presences ultimately resolves the case.
II.

BASED ON THE FACTS AT TRIAL A JURY COULD NOT
REASONABLY FIND A LACK OF "PROBABLE CAUSE"
FOR SPENCER'S CLAIM OF ALIENATION OF AFFECTION.
Assuming for argument purposes, that the lack of probable cause is solely a

question of fact for the jury (or that the right for a legal determination from the court was
not preserved), with the admission of Nielsen that he had a sexual relationship with
Jewelya during her marriage to Spencer, and that Nielsen fathered two children with
Jewelya during her marriage to Spencer; a reasonable jury cannot find a lack of probable
cause. With these admissions the disputed evidence, even when marshaled against
Spencer, is insufficient for the jury to find that Spencer lacked probable cause to file his
alienation of affection claim against Nielsen.
The disputed facts marshaled against Spencer on this claim are as follows:
Spencer had a sexual encounter with Shanua Thompson, there was physical abuse in the
marriage, Spencer would leave home for business and speaking engagements, Spencer
was charged with sexual solicitation, Spencer threatened to sue Nielsen when he found
out about the affair and the twins, Spencer and Jewelya would fight in their marriage and
sometimes separate, Spencer and Jewelya at one time separated for a full month, Spencer
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inquired if Jewelya had sexual encounters with other men, Spencer was under stress from
other lawsuits he filed as a landlord, and a suit against Jewelya on her ZCMI charge card,
Spencer approached Nielsen at his employment and threatened him with a lawsuit and
told Nielsen that he would bury him in costs and attorneys' fees, Spencer recorded the
conversation and the later destroyed the tape because it was incriminating against him.
Even with all of these facts marshaled against him, based on the admitted
fact that Nielsen had an ongoing sexual relationship with his wife, and fathered two
children, Spencer had sufficient probable cause under the law, to file his alienation of
affection lawsuit, and argue to the jury in his alienation of affection case, that it was
Nielsen's ongoing sexual relations and improper conduct with his wife, that was the
controlling factor in destroying his marriage.
A reasonable jury cannot determine that Spencer lacked probable cause to
file his alienation of affection claim against Nielsen; therefore, the jury's finding of
wrongful use of civil proceeding against Spencer, should be vacated.
III.

THE TERMINATION OF THE UNDERLYING ACTION AS
A DISCOVERY SANCTION WAS NOT "ON THE MERITS"
IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN A CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL USE
OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
In Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774 (Ut.App. 2004) affd 147 P.3d 383 (Utah

2006), it was held and affirmed, in the context of a claim for wrongful use of civil
proceedings, that termination in favor of the person against whom the underlying action
was brought requires that the termination must be "on the merits" of the underlying
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action. Id. citing Lackner v. LaCroix, 602 P.2d 393 (Calif. 1979).
The termination of the underlying alienation of affection claim, in this case
was a discovery sanction based on Rule 37(b)(2)(C). (Rec. 802, f 22) It was not on the
merits. Neither the court, nor the jury, made any determination of the alienation of
affection claim based on its merits.6 Therefore, there was no termination of the prior
action on the merits, as required to sustain a claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings.
Hatch v. Davis, supra.
Furthermore, the issue as to whether there was a favorable termination on
the merits is a question of law for the court to decide, and not a question for the jury.
Palmer Development Corp. v. Gordon, 723 A.2d 881 (Me. 1999). Restatement (Second)
Torts, Section 673. The trial court recognizing that the previous claim for alienation of
affection was dismissed as a discovery sanction, rather than on its merits, should have
ruled, as a matter of law, that there was no termination of the prior proceeding "on the
merits" to sustain a claim for wrongful use of civil proceeding. Id.
The claim that the alienation of affection claim was never dismissed based
on the merits, but only as a discovery sanctions, was raised before the trial court by
Spencer's counsel. (Rec. 1199, pgs. 551-554). Including the fact that the earlier
proceeding was only dismissed as a discovery sanction. (Rec. 1199, pg. 553). If not
properly raised, the matter should still be considered by this court under the principles of
6

In fact, in dismissing the alienation of affection case as a discovery sanction,
Judge Dawson stated that it was impossible to ascertain whether the allegations of
plaintiffs complaint had any factual merit. (Rec. 1201, pg. 242).
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plain error or exceptional circumstances.
Plain Error and Exceptional Circumstances. Again to demonstrate plain
error a party must establish that (i) an error exits (ii) the error should have been obvious to
the trial court, and (hi) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993). As
stated above, the claim for wrongful use of civil proceeding requires, "a termination of
the prior proceedings on the merits." That did not happen in this case. Therefore, an
error exists and the first element is met. Second, the trial court should have known that
the dismissal of the alienation of affection claim for failure to comply with discovery was
not on the merits. In fact Judge Dawson in dismissing the action stated that it was
impossible to ascertain whether the allegations in the complaint had any factual merit.
(Rec. 1201, pg. 242). Third, a ruling by the trial court that there was no prior termination
on the merits, would have dramatically changed the outcome of the case, resulting in a
much more favorable result for Spencer. State v. Evans, 20 P.3d 888 (Utah 2001).
If not reviewable under the plain error rule, it should be reviewed under the
exceptional circumstances rule based upon a clarification in the law. State v. Haston, 846
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1995); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994). In the recent case of
Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774 (Ut.App. 2004) aff'd 147 P.3d 383 (Utah 2006)7 the
appellate courts recently clarified that in the context of a claim for wrongful use of civil

1

Hatch v. Davis was affirmed on August 11, 2006, over a month after the trial was
held in this case.
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proceeding, the termination of the underlying action must be on the merits. Id.
And finally, this matter is also a question of law, based on undisputed facts
therefore, the exception to the preservation rule should be applied. Pankratz Implement
Co. v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 130 P.3d 57 (Kan. 2006)
IV,

BASED ON THE FACTS AT TRIAL, A JURY COULD NOT
REASONABLY FIND THAT THE UNDERLYING ACTION
WAS DISMISSED ON THE MERITS TO SUSTAIN A CLAIM
FOR THE WRONGFUL USE OF CIVIL PROCEEDING.
Assuming for argument purposes, that the question as to whether the

underlying case was dismissed on the merits is solely a question for the jury (or that the
right for a legal determination from the court was not preserved), based on the undisputed
facts in this case, and the Order entered by Judge Dawson, a reasonable jury could not
find that the alienation of affection claim was dismissed on the merits.
It was undisputed in this case, that the alienation of affection claim was
dismissed by Judge Dawson, not based on the merits, but as a discovery sanction under
Rule 37(b)(2)(C). (Rec. 802, \ 22). Judge Dawson even made a specific finding in his
Order of dismissal that due to the lack of discovery, it was impossible to have a trial on
the merits or to ascertain whether the allegations of Plaintiff s complaint, had any factual
merit. (Rec. 1201, pg. 242).
Therefore, based on these undisputed facts, a reasonable jury cannot find
the exact opposite from Judge Dawson's ruling; and determine that the dismissal of the
alienation of affection claim was on the merits. Since there was no dismissal of the
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alienation of affection claim based on the merits, Nielsen cannot prevail on his claim for
wrongful use of civil proceeding to recover his attorneys' fees and the jury's finding
entered against him on this claim should be vacated.8
V.

THERE WAS NO WILLFUL ACT IN THE USE OF LEGAL
PROCESS, SO OUTSIDE THE REGULAR COURSE OF THE
PROCEEDINGS, TO CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF PROCESS
In Hatch v. Davis, 102 P.3d 774 (Ut.App. 2004) affd 147 P.3d 383 (Utah

2006), two separate elements for abuse of process were set forth: (1) an ulterior purpose;
and (2) "a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular course of the
proceeding." Id. quoting William Prosser, Law of Torts, Section 121 at 857, 4th edition,
1971). While the purpose or intent is a question of fact for the jury, the issue as to
whether an act is "a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular course of
the proceeding/5 should be an issue of law for the court to decide.
The court is in the best position, and has the superior knowledge and
experience, to determine exactly what is "outside the regular course of proceeding" and
what is not. For example, in this case, Spencer subpoenaed Nielsen's mother and wife for
depositions, with proper notice, and Nielsen's counsel had an opportunity to object, based
on age, hardship, etc. The court held a hearing and granted Nielsen's motion to prevent
the depositions. After the court's ruling no further attempt was made by Spencer or his
8

Any claim for attorneys' fees as a sanction was available to Nielsen in the
alienation of affection case and this was considered by Judge Dawson; however, Judge
Dawson felt dismissal alone was sufficient, and did not feel the sanction of attorneys' fees
should be added. (Rec. 804, f 27). Although he did indicate that he might reconsider the
fee request, if the matter came back to him after appeal. (Rec. 809, f 2).
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counsel to depose these individuals. The court could have easily determined that issuing
subpoenas and having hearings on discovery requests was not outside the regular course
of the proceedings, given the issues involved in the case. The jury had no basis to make
this determination.
Likewise, each individual item listed by Nielsen as an abuse of the civil
process (Instruction 19, Rec. 620) does not constitute "a willful act outside the regular
course of the proceeding, not proper in the regular course of the proceeding." Particularly
when standing alone, and the trial court erred in allowing the jury to determine that any
one of these items could constitute such an abuse.9 Since the actions listed alone cannot
singularly constitute an abuse of process, the jury finding for abuse of process should be
vacated.
The legal requirements for abuse of process, and whether the items listed in
Jury Instruction 19 alone can constitute an abuse of process, was raised in the trial court
by Spencer's counsel. (Rec. 1199, pg. 544-546). If not properly raised, the matter should
still be considered by this court under the principles of plain error and/or exceptional
circumstances.
Plain Error and Exceptional Circumstances. Again to demonstrate plain
error a party must establish that (i) an error exits (ii) the error should have been obvious to
the trial court, and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
9

In fact, some of the individual items listed do not even constitute use of the legal
process, such as losing or destroying evidence, misrepresenting facts, engaging in delay
tactics, and attempting to influence witnesses. (Rec. 620)
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likelihood of a more favorable result. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993). As
stated above there was an error in this case. The claim for abuse of process requires (1)
an ulterior purpose; and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular
course of the proceeding. Since the items listed for the jury to consider do not constitute a
use of the civil process and/or a willful use of the civil process not proper in the regular
course of the proceedings, the first element is met. Second, the trial court should have
known that whether there was an abuse of the legal process, is a question of law for the
court to determine and not the jury; and that the items listed for the jury standing alone do
not constitute a use of the process not proper in the regular course of the proceedings.
Such a ruling by the trial court would have dramatically changed the outcome of the case,
and would have resulted in a more favorable result for Spencer. State v. Evans, 20 P.3d
888 (Utah 2001).
VI.

ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR WRONGFUL USE OF CIVIL
PROCEEDING CONSTITUTES GENERAL DAMAGES
THUS, NOT ALLOWING PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
A trial court's decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest is a question

of law, reviewed for correctness. Smith v. Fairfax Realty Inc., 82 P.3d 1064 (Utah 2003).
Where the amount of the damage is to be ascertained by the jury at trial, prejudgment
interest is not allowed. Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995); Canyon Country
Store v. Barcey, 781 P.2d 414,422 (Utah 1989).
In this case, Nielsen in his complaint asks for his reasonable attorneys' fees
and costs in defending the prior suit, and in pursuing this matter. He also asks for lost
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earnings and benefits, loss of employment time, emotional distress, mental pain and
suffering, medical expenses, and other expenses, to be determined according to proof}0
(emphasis added, Rec. 1-7). Nielsen cannot receive prejudgment interest on his damage
award of attorneys' fees, because his entitlement and the reasonableness of the fee, was
not determined until trial. James Constructors, Inc., v. Salt Lake City, Corp., 888 P.2d
665, 671 (UtApp. 1994).
VII.

ATTORNEYS' FEES AWARDED FOR WRONGFUL USE
OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
"SPECIAL DAMAGES" UNDER 78-27-44 U.C.A. ENTITLING
NIELSEN TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
Section 78-27-44 U.C.A. provides:

78-27-44, Personal injury judgments - Interest authorized,
(1) In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained
by any person resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any other person, corporation,
association, or partnership, whether by negligence or willful intent of that other person,
corporation, association, or partnership, and whether that injury shall have resulted fatally
or otherwise, the plaintiff in the complaint may claim interest on the special damages
actually incurred from the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of
action.
(2) It is the duty of the court, in entering judgment for plaintiff in that
action, to add to the amount of special damages actually incurred that are assessed by the
verdict of the jury, or found by the court, interest on that amount calculated at the legal
rate as defined in Section 15-1-1, from the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to
the cause of action to the date of entering the judgment, and to include it in that judgment
"Special damages" under Section 78-27-44 U.C.A., are not the same as
special damages insofar as pleading requirements are concerned. Gleave v. Denver Rio

10

The Special Verdict form does not breakdown any of the damage award into any
of these specific categories. (Rec. 640-641).
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Grande Western Railroad Co., 749 P.2d 660 (Ut.App. 1988). "Special damages" under
Section 78-27-44 U.C.A., are limited in scope. They are limited to expenses paid to those
who are injured so they can immediately receive necessary medical and hospital care.
(emphasis added). Id. at 672, reviewing Senate Bill 153 and legislative history of Section
78-27-44 U.C.A.
In this case Nielsen asked the jury to award him $95,000.00 for the
attorneys' fees he had spent in defending the alienation of affection case. (Rec. 1199, pg.
439). It was not to reimburse Nielsen for any out-of-pocket expenses actually paid to
others to receive necessary medical and hospital care. In fact, Nielsen testified at trial
that he did not seek any medical treatment and had no claims against Spencer for medical
expenses. (Rec. 1199, pg. 444). Therefore, since Nielsen did not incur any medical
expenses in this case, and his damage award was for his attorneys' fees; this award should
not be classified as "special damages" under 78-27-44 UCA, to entitle Nielsen to
prejudgment interest. Id.
VIII. NIELSEN FAILED TO MAKE A CLAIM IN HIS COMPLAINT
FOR PREJUDGEMENT INTEREST ON "SPECIAL DAMAGES
ACTUALLY INCURRED" AS REQUIRED TO BE ENTITLED TO
AN AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST UNDER SECTION
78-27-44 U.C.A.
Nielsen in his complaint does not make any claim for "interest on special
damages actually incurred from the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the
cause of action," as required under Section 78-27-44 U.C.A. Nielsen in his Complaint
does not make any claim for prejudgment interest. (Rec. 1-7) Nielsen does not make any
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claim for prejudgment interest based on his medical expenses under Section 78-27-44.
(Rec. 1-7). Nielsen at trial, testified that he did not seek any medical treatment and had
no claims against Spencer for medical expenses. (Rec. 1199, pg. 444).
In Gleave v. Denver Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 749 P.2d 660
(Ut.App. 1988), the plaintiff was required to amend his complaint to include a claim for
prejudgment interest under Section 78-27-44 U.C.A., before prejudgment interest could
be awarded. The statute requires the Plaintiff to make his claim for interest on the special
damages in his complaint, before it is the duty of the court, "to add to the amount of
special damages actually incurred that are assessed by the verdict of the jury, or found by
the court, interest on that amount." 78-27-44 U.C.A.
In this case, there was no claim made in the complaint for such "special
damages" and there was no determination of such "special damages actually incurred" by
the jury. Therefore, Nielsen is not entitled to have his damage award for attorneys' fees
deemed to be "special damages" under 78-27-44 U.C.A., to entitle him to prejudgment
interest.
IX.

THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE SPECIAL
VERDICT, THAT IT AWARDS $95,000 IN SPECIAL DAMAGES
WITH NO GENERAL DAMAGES IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW
The trial court's ruling that the amount of the jury verdict is all special

damages with no general damages (Rec. 1096-1100), is contrary to the law.
It is improper for a jury to award special damages for personal injury torts,
without awarding any general damages. Balderas v. Starks, 138 P.3d 75 (Ut.App. 2006);
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Langton v. International Transport Inc., 491 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Utah 1971). Therefore,
the trial court's ruling regarding prejudgment interest based on this determination of
special damages under 78-27-44 U.C.A., needs to be reversed.
This matter was preserved. The Special Verdict form does not designate
that the $95,000.00 amount awarded is special damages. Therefore, Spencer is not
objecting to the form of the Special Verdict; but rather, the trial court's subsequent
interpretation of the Verdict form in November 2006, which is contrary to the law. Id.
CONCLUSION
Based on the admitted facts at trial, Spencer had "probable cause" to bring a
claim against Nielsen for alienation of affection. This is a question of law that should
have been decided by the court. Regardless, a reasonable jury based on the admitted facts
at trial, cannot find thait Spencer lacked sufficient probable cause to file his alienation of
affection claim against Nielsen. Moreover, the dismissal of the alienation of affection
claim as a discovery seinction, does not constitute a termination "on the merits," in order
to sustain a claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings. This also is a question of law for
the court to decide, and not the jury. Regardless, based on the undisputed facts and the
Order of Judge Dawson, a reasonable jury cannot find that the alienation of affection case
was dismissed on the merits.
The alleged actions that Nielsen claims Spencer took in the underlying
alienation of affection action, do not (particularly when standing alone) constitute a
"willful act in the use of the process, which is not proper in the regular course of the
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proceeding," in order to sustain a claim for abuse of process. Furthermore, while the
question of an ulterior motive is a question of fact for the jury, the question as to what
constitutes a "willful act in the use of the process, not proper in the regular course of the
proceeding," should be a question of law for the court to determine.
The provision of Section 78-27-44 U.C.A., which allows prejudgment
interest on special damages actually incurred for medical treatment, should not apply in
this case on a general damage claim for attorneys' fees, incurred in defending an
underlying action, on a wrongful use of civil proceeding claim. Particularly when the
entitlement to the fee and the amount was not determined until trial.
Furthermore, "special damages" under Section 78-27-44 U.C.A., are not the
same as special damages as far as pleading requirements are concerned. They are limited
in scope to expenses paid to those who are injured so they can receive immediate medical
and hospital care, if necessary. They should not be awarded in this case where there is no
claim for medical expenses.
Finally, the trial court's interpretation of the Special Verdict form that the
amount awarded of $95,000.00 is all "special damages" under Section 78-27-44 U.C.A.,
with no general damages, is contrary to the law; as there must be an award of general
damages before there can be any award of special damages for personal injury torts.
Therefore, the $95,000.00 award cannot be all "special damages" to support an award of
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prejudgment interest under Section 78-27-44 U.C.A.
Based upon the foregoing, the Verdict reached and Judgment entered in the
above case should be reversed and/or set aside. The claims for wrongful use of civil
proceeding and abuse of process should be ordered dismissed, as a matter of law, based
on the failure of the legal elements, as set forth above.
Alternatively, the Verdict and Judgment should be reversed and/or set aside
and the case remanded back to the trial court with proper instructions on the legal
requirements necessary for Nielsen to prevail on his claims for wrongful use of civil
proceedings and abuse of process.
DATED this / ^ d a y of December, 2007.
BOND & CALL L.C.
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ADDENDUM
Special Verdict, dated June 9,2006. (Rec. 640-641).
Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Prejudgment Interest and Costs.
Dated November 30,2006. (Rec. 1096-1100).
Second Amended Proposed Judgment on Special Verdict,
entered December 29,2006. (Rec. 1101 -1104).
Section 78-27-44 Utah Code Annotated.
Restatement (Second) Torts, Section 618B.

EXHIBIT "A"
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JUN 1 3 2008
SECOND
DISTRICT
COURT
IN AND FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
'COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL REID NIELSEN,
Plaintiff,

SPECIAL VERDICT

v.
LORENZO M. SPENCER,

Civil No. 010700616

Defendant.

Judge Rodney S. Page

At the end of each question submitted to you the jury, indicate whether or not
you adopt it as your verdict by answering Yes or No. The agreement of six or more jurors
is required to answer each question, unanimous agreement on each question is not necessary.
We, the Jury, present our answers to the questions submitted by the Court, to which
we have all agreed:
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION - WRONGFUL BRINGING OF A CIVIL ACTION
1. Did the Defendant wrongfully bring a civil action by bringing the lawsuit
against the plaintiff for alienation of affections, according to the instructions?

~YesI^ V /

No

If you have answered the preceding question yes, please state the amount of
damages you are awarding the Plaintiff for the Defendant's wrongfully bringing a civil
action.

%000
U-

Special Verdict

n - r n - 7 <->/%*>.«/•»

UW

PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION - ABUSE OF PROCESS
2. Did the Defendant commit abuse of process in bringing and continuing
the lawsuit against the Plaintiff, according to the instructions?

(fep XX

No

If you have answered the preceding question yes, please state the amount of
damages you are awarding the Plaintiff for the Defendant's Abuse of Process.

s

^
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

3. If, but only if, you awarded damages in answer to question 1 or 2, answer this
question: Has Plaintiff proved by clear and convincing evidence that the acts of Defendant
were a result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct or conduct that
manifested a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of the rights of others?
ANSWER: Yes

XNQ)

MC

When you have answered the appropriate questions, please have your foreperson sign
this verdict form and return to the Court.

Jury Foreperson

/ D a t e

EXHIBIT "B"

NOV 3 0 200B
S E C O N D DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF U p " A H S E C O N D
DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY OF DAVIS, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT

Michael Reid Nielsen
Plaintiff,

RULING ON PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND

COSTS
Case No. 010700616
Lorenzo M. Spencer
Defendant
Judge: Rodney S. Page
COMES NOW THE COURT, and having considered plaintiff's proposed
judgment for prejudgment interest and for costs, and the memorandum submitted in
support thereof, and defendant's memorandum in opposition thereto, and the
arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, rules as follows:
The crux of plaintiff's argument on the interest question is that a cause of action
for wrongful use of a civil proceeding is a personal injury action and therefore plaintiff is
entitled to prejudgment interest on special damages as provided in Section 78-27-44
UCA, 1953 as amended. Plaintiff claims that prejudgment interest should be awarded
on the attorney's fees awarded as special damages; and further, that the interest
should be calculated from the date the wrongful civil action was filed.
As to the question of whether an action for wrongful bringing of a civil action is a
personal injury, it is important to note that over the years, several different causes of
action involving the inappropriate use of the courts and court proceedings have
emerged. They have been referred to by various terms, and those terms have often
been used interchangeably.
R u l i n g on Plaintiff's Motion for I
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To clarify this confusion our Supreme Court has stated that there are three
different categories of similar, but distinct, torts involving abuse and manipulation of the
public judicial process: 1) abuse of process; 2) malicious prosecution; and 3) wrongful
use of civil proceedings. Gilbert vs Ince 981 P2nd 841 (UT 1999). The Court went on
to indicate that abuse of process occurs when one uses legal process against another
primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed; that malicious
prosecution relates only to criminal actions and pertains to a private person who
improperly initiates or procures the initiation of criminal proceedings against another
who is not guilty of the offense charged; and that wrongful use of a civil proceeding
occurs when one initiates or maintains a civil proceeding against another for an
improper purpose and without a justifiable basis. Gilbert, Supra.
The elements of malicious prosecution and wrongful use of civil proceedings are
very similar, except that one involves action of a prosecuting authority and the other a
private party. Both require that the action be terminated in favor of the person against
whom they were brought.
On the question of whether the wrongful use of a civil proceeding is an action for
personal injury, it is important to note that our Supreme Court, as early as 1907,
included malicious prosecution as a personal injury tort. Fell vs Union Pacific RY, 88 P.
1003 (UT 1907). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted a similar position.
Public Service Co. Of Colo, vs Continental Casualty, 26 F. 3rd 1508 (10th Cir 1994).
Our Supreme Court, in the Gilbert Case cited above, stated that the wrongful use
of civil proceeding is the civil counterpart of malicious prosecution. Therefore, the Court
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concludes that an action for wrongful use of civil proceeding is a cause of action for
personal injury; and that pursuant to Section 78-27-44, plaintiff is entitled to interest on
the special damages actually incurred from the date of the occurrence of the act giving
rise to the cause of action.
Special damages are a particular type of damage which are the natural
consequence of the injury cause, but are not the type of damages that necessarily flow
from the harmful act. Special damages must be pled specifically so that the opposing
party has an adequate opportunity to defend against the plaintiff's claim. Rule 9{g) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires special pleading of special damages, not
specific amounts.
Plaintiff, in his complaint, pled special damages for costs and expenses of
defending the underlying civil action. Given the facts submitted to the jury, and the fact
that the jury award was the exact amount of attorney's fees and costs claimed by the
plaintiff for defending the underlying action, the Court concludes that they are special
damages.
The statute provides that interest on special damages shall be calculated from
the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action.
The Law provides that a tort cause of action accrues when all of the elements
come into being and the claim is actionable. Given the elements of wrongful use of civil
proceedings, that cause of action did not accrue until the wrongful action was
terminated in plaintiff's favor; therefore plaintiff is entitled to interest at the legal rate on
the special damages from the date the action was terminated in his favor.
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The cases cited by plaintiff on that issue are not on point, and deal primarily with
the issue of at what point coverage should be extended for insurance purposes.
As to costs, Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the
awarding of costs to the prevailing party. Plaintiff is entitled to his reasonable costs and
they are not precluded by the jury award in this case, as that clearly did not include the
costs of this action.
The Court finds that the costs requested by the plaintiff are reasonable. As to
the requests for costs of depositions, costs of depositions are taxable, when the Court
is persuaded that they were taken in good faith and, in light of the circumstances,
appeared to be essential for the development and presentation of the case. In this
case, the status of the Spencer marriage at the time of plaintiff's involvement was
critical, and the testimony of Mr. Spencer and his ex-wife were core to that issue. There
was no less expensive way to provide that discovery prior to trial. The Court grants
costs to the plaintiff as requested.
Plaintiffs counsel is directed to prepare a judgment in accordance with the
Court's ruling and to submit the same to opposing counseling at least five days prior to
the time it is submitted to the Court for signature.

Dated this . 3 7 ^

day of November, AD 2006
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruling to:
C. Richard Henriksen, Jr.
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Budge W. Call
Judge Building
8 East Broadway, Suite 720
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
postage prepaid this
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day of November, AD 2006.

Alyson Brown
Clerk of Court
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C. RICHARD HENRIKSEN, JR., #1466
HENRIKSEN & HENRIKSEN, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)521-4145
Facsimile: (801)355-0246

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL REID NIELSEN,

SECOND AMENDED PROPOSED
) JUDGEMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiff,
)

v.
LORENZO M. SPENCER,
Defendant.

Civil No. 010700616
Judge Rodney S. Page

The above captioned case was tried before this Court and a jury on June 7, 8,
and 9, the Honorable Rodney S. Page, District Court Judge, presiding. C. Richard
Henriksen, Jr. represented the Plaintiff and Brent A. Chipman represented the Defendant.
The jury returned with the following special verdict:
We, the Jury, present our answers to the questions submitted by the Court, to
which we have all agreed:
PLAINTIFFS CAUSE OF ACTION- WRONGFUL BRINGING OF A CIVIL ACTION

JUDGMENT ENTERED
JD19387368

1. Did the Defendant wrongfully bring a civil action by bringing the lawsuit
against the Plaintiff for alienation of affections, according to the instructions?
Yes

X

No

If you have answered the preceding question yes, please state the amount of
damages you are awarding the Plaintiff for the Defendant's wrongfully bring a civil action.
$

95,000.00
PLAINTIFFS CAUSE OF ACTION- ABUSE OF PROCESS

2. Did the Defendant commit abuse of process in bringing and continuing the
lawsuit against the plaintiff, according to the instructions ?
Yes

X

No

If you have answered the preceding question yes, please state the amount of
damages you are awarding the Plaintiff for the Defendant's Abuse of Process.

$

a00
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

3. If, but only if, you awarded damages in answer to question 1 or 2, answer
this question: Has Plaintiff proved by clear and convincing evidence that the acts of
Defendant were a result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or
conduct that manifested a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of,
the rights of others?
ANSWER: Yes

No

X

When you have answered the appropriate questions, please have your
foreperson sign this verdict form and return to the Court.

/s/ Neil Reed
Jury Foreperson
June 9, 2006
Date

The issues having duly been tried and the jury having duly rendered its verdict,
it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
1.

That the Defendant wrongfully brought a civil action by bringing the

lawsuit against the Plaintiff for alienation of affections.
2.

That the damages awarded to the Plaintiff for the Defendant's

wrongfully bringing a civil action is $95,000.00.
3.

That the Defendant committed abuse of process in bringing and

continuing the iawsuit against the Plaintiff.
4.

That the Plaintiff recover nothing for the Defendant's Abuse of

5.

That the acts of the Defendant were not proved by clear and

Process.

convincing evidence to be a result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent
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conduct or conduct that manifested a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a
disregard of, the rights of others.
6.

That the Plaintiff is awarded statutory pre-judgment interest on 10%

per annum on the special damages awarded of $95,000.00 from April 3, 2001 to date of
Judgment.
7.

That the Plaintiff is awarded its costs of Court for the current case,

Nielsen v. Spencer, Civil No. 010700616 in the amount of $1,499.10.
8.

The entire judgment, including prejudgment interest and costs shall

bear interest at the post-judgment rate of 6.36% per annum.
DATED this 2t>+^ day of December, 2006.
BY THE COURT:

62a... sLQ-^.
Rodney S. <P^ge
District Court Judge
Approved as to Form and Content:

Budge W. Call
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of December, 2006, a true and correct

copy of SECOND AMENDED PROPOSED JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT, was
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:

BUDGE W. CALL
BOND & CALL
8 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 720
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
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14. Personal injury judgments — Interest authorized.
In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by any person, resulting from or
ned by the tort of any other person, corporation, association, or partnership, whether by negligence or willful
•f that other person, corporation, association, or partnership, and whether that injury shall have resulted fatally or
se, the plaintiff in the complaint may claim interest on the special damages actually incurred from the date of the
nee of the act giving rise to the cause of action.
It is the duty of the court, in entering judgment for plaintiff in that action, to add to the amount of special
;s actually incurred that are assessed by the verdict of the jury, or found by the court, interest on that amount
ted at the legal rate, as defined in Section 15-1-1, from the date of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the
faction to the date of entering the judgment, and to include it in that judgment.
As used in this section, "special damages actually incurred" does not include damages for future medical
3S, loss of future wages, or loss of future earning capacity.
ended by Chapter 123, 1991 General Session
Lawriter Corporation. All rights reserved.
Casemaker Online database is a compilation exclusively owned by Lawriter Corporation. The database is provided for use
le terms, notices and conditions as expressly stated under the online end user license agreement to which all users assent
to access the database.

EXHIBIT "E

§ 681A
§ 681 A.

TORTS, SECOND

Ch. 31

Burden of Proof

In an action for wrongful civil proceedings the plaintiff
has the burden of proving, when the issue is properly
raised, that
(a) the defendant has initiated, continued or procured the civil proceedings against him;
(b) the proceedings were terminated in his favor;
(c) the defendant did not have probable cause for his
action;
(d) the primary purpose for which the proceedings
were brought was not that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim on which the proceedings were
based;
(e) he suffered special harm, and the extent of the
harm;
(f) the circumstances make the recovery of punitive
damages appropriate.
Comment:
a. The rules stated in this Section are analogous to those
stated as to an action for malicious prosecution in § 672, with
the exception that Subsection (2) of that Section, dealing with
the defendant's burden of proving the guilt of the accused, is
not here applicable. With that exception, the Comments under
§ 672 are applicable to this Section, in so far as they are pertinent.
§ 681B.

Functions of Court and Jury

(1) In an action for wrongful civil proceedings, the
court determines whether
(a) a civil proceeding has been initiated;
(b) the proceeding was terminated in favor of the
plaintiff;
(c) the defendant had probable cause for his action;
(d) the harm suffered by the plaintiff is a proper
element for the jury to consider in assessing damages.
See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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Ch. 30

WRONGFUL CIVIL PROCEEDINGS

§

68IB

(2) In an action for wrongful civil proceedings, subject
to the control of the court, the jury determines
(a) the circumstances under which the proceedings
were initiated in so far as may be necessary to enable
the court to determine whether the defendant had probable cause for initiating them;
(b) whether the defendant acted primarily for a
purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim on which the proceeding was based;
(c) the circumstances under which the proceedings
were terminated;
(d) the amount that the plaintiff is entitled to recover as general and special damages;
(e) whether punitive damages are to be awarded,
and if so, in what amount.
Comment:
a. The rules stated in this Section are analogous to those
stated as to the action for malicious prosecution in § 673. The
Comments under that Section are therefore applicable here so
far as they are pertinent.

See Appendix for Reporter's Notes, Court Citations, and Cross References
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